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What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
Abstract
The study examines the reasons for financial crises in 31 emerging market countries during
1980-2001. It estimates a probit model using 23 macroeconomic and financial sector
variables. Traditional variables such as unemployment and inflation, as well as several
indicators of indebtedness such as private sector liabilities and the foreign liabilities of
banks explain currency crises rather well, and it appears currency crises occur in tandem
with banking crises. Indeed, in emerging market countries vulnerability to crisis is
exacerbated by situations involving large liabilities that permit sudden capital outflows.
Increases in indebtedness followed the liberalisation of capital flows and domestic
financial sectors.
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What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
Tiivistelmä
Tutkimuksessa selvitetään rahoituskriisien syitä 31 kehittyvässä maassa vuosina 1980–
2001. Selittävinä muuttujina tutkimuksessa on 23 makrotaloutta ja rahoitussektoria
kuvaavaa indikaattoria, joiden vaikutusta kriisiin tarkastellaan probit-menetelmän avulla.
Tulosten perusteella valuuttakriisejä selittävät erityisen hyvin eräät perinteiset muuttujat,
kuten työttömyys ja inflaatio, ja useat maan velkaantuneisuutta kuvaavat indikaattorit,
kuten yksityisen sektorin velkaantuminen ja pankkien ulkomainen velkaantuminen. Lisäksi
valuutta- ja pankkikriisit näyttävät esiintyvän samanaikaisesti. Tutkimuksen perusteella
kehittyvät maat ovat erityisen kriisialttiita, kun viranomaiset tai yritykset ovat laskeneet
liikkeeseen huomattavan määrän velkakirjoja, mikä mahdollistaa pääomien  äkillisen
maastavirtauksen. Tarkastelluissa maissa velkaantuminen voimistui selvästi kotimaan
rahoitussektorin ja pääomavirtojen vapauttamisen jälkeen.
		: valuuttakriisit, pankkikriisit, kehittyvät maat, liberalisointi,  probit-menetelmä
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1  Introduction
During 1995–2001, over a dozen emerging market countries experienced severe financial
crises. Arguably, these recent crises were more frequent and more painful than in the past,
so it may be appropriate to ask whether something has changed in the economic
environment. Are the reasons for these crises somehow different from earlier financial
crises?
Although numerous empirical studies seek to identify causes for past crises and early-
warning indicators that might be used to avoid future crises,
￿ only few studies apply
commonly used indicators simultaneously. A further shortcoming of the literature is that
only a small number of studies focus solely on emerging market or developing countries.
The ways in which liberalisation of capital flows and financial sectors change the
economic environment −  and influence the likelihood of crisis −  has yet to be adequately
addressed.
This study aims to contribute to the literature in various ways:  We exclusively focus
on emerging market countries to identify reasons for their crises, and we are able to include
recent crisis episodes from 1997–2001.
We include several banking sector indicators and attempt to determine whether
banking sector troubles induced the recent crises.
We apply the most commonly used macroeconomic variables. Since all these
indicators are now studied simultaneously, we hope to detect the interaction of the
variables and distinguish the actual causes of recent crises in emerging markets.
According to one line of argument, financial liberalisation (which occurred in the
1980s or in early 1990s in most of the countries we discuss) rendered these economies
vulnerable to sudden capital outflows and crises. We thus examine how liberalisation of
financial sectors and capital flows may have modified the causes for financial crises.
This study examines financial crises in 31 emerging market countries during the
period 1980:1–2001:12. It estimates a probit model using 23 macroeconomic and financial
sector indicators, including dummy variables for banking crises, exchange rate regime, and
financial liberalisation. We find certain traditional variables, e.g. unemployment and
inflation, and several indicators of indebtedness, e.g. private sector liabilities and the
foreign liabilities of banks to explain currency crises rather well. Indeed, in the examined
countries vulnerability to crisis is exacerbated by situations involving large liabilities that
allow sudden capital outflows.
This paper is structured so that the following section presents an overview of the
existing literature. Section 3 considers methodological questions, our indicators and data
sets, while section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 examines the role of liberalisation in
greater depth and suggests a prescription for a typical crisis. The final section concludes.
                                                
1 See Chui (2002), Goldstein et al (2002), and Kaminsky et al. (1998) for surveys.Tuomas Komulainen and Johanna Lukkarila What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
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2  Literature review
The empirical literature on currency and financial crises can be categorised according to
three methodological approaches.
2 The first branch comprises case studies that concentrate
on specific crisis episodes. These studies, while highly informative, usually do not seek to
isolate general causes of crises, but rather analyse particular episodes. Notable examples
are Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Glick and Rose (1998), and Blanco and Garber
(1986).
The second group of studies is based on the “signal approach” devised by Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1996). The basic premise is that an economy behaves differently on the eve
of a financial crisis than during times of normalcy. These studies identify variables that
catch systematically deviant behaviour prior to crisis episodes. The signal approach is a
bilateral model - it examines one particular economic variable individually. A variable is
said to issue a signal when it departs from its mean beyond a certain threshold. The
threshold level is chosen for each indicator in a way that minimises the risk of false signals
and the risk of missing crises, i.e. it minimises the “signal-to-noise ratio”.
Kaminsky et al (1998) use the signal approach to predict currency crises for a sample
of five industrial and 15 developing countries during the years 1970–1995. In their study,
an indicator exceeding a specified threshold is interpreted as a warning signal that a
currency crisis may take place within the following 24 months. They find that variables
with the greatest explanatory power include exports, deviation of the real exchange rate
from trend, the ratio of broad money to reserves, output, and equity prices.
3 The signal
approach is further applied in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Kaminsky (1999).
Perhaps the most careful attempt to craft an early-warning system is found in Goldstein et
al (2000).
A major advantage of the signal method is the evaluation of each indicator’s
individual predictive power, because it provides easily understandable results for policy
purposes. However, since the interaction among variables is ignored, the actual reasons for
crises may be obscured. A further drawback of the signal method is that the explanatory
variables, as well as the probability of a crisis, are defined as a step function. Thus, the
model fails to distinguish whether the value of the variable barely or greatly exceeds the
threshold.
4 Finally, standard statistical tests are inapplicable to the signal approach.
Some of the problems in the signal approach are solved with limited-dependent or
discrete-choice models. This method uses logit or probit functions and the predicted
outcome, i.e. probability of crises, is constrained between zero and one.
5 The overall effect
of the explanatory variables is evaluated simultaneously. Standard statistical tests are also
possible. Since our aim is to identify reasons for crises, i.e. select appropriate variables and
control for simultaneity, we use probit model for estimating the crisis indicators.
                                                
2 Vlaar (2000) and Schardax (2002) provide good summaries of different methodological approaches used in
empirical studies.
3 Berg and Pattillo (1999) re-estimated the approach of Kaminsky et al (1998) to see whether the Asian crises
might have been predictable using their approach. They obtained varying results. Most crises were not
signalled in advance, and there were several false signals. However, the predictions were still better than
random guesses.
4 The step function takes a value of zero when the indicator variable is below the threshold and a value of one
if it is above the threshold.
5 Some studies, like Tanner (2001) and Bussière −  Mulder (1999), use continuous exchange market pressure
index and apply then standard regression models to analyze the depreciation and loss of reserves.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2003
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Among the earliest studies of this type, Eichengreen et al (1996) use data from 1959
through 1993 for industrial countries to characterise the common causes for currency crises
and illuminate the contagious nature of currency crises. Frankel and Rose (1996) use a
probit model to estimate the probability of crisis in an annual sample of 105 developing
countries covering the period 1971–1992. They note that currency crises tend to occur
when growth of domestic credit and foreign interest rates are high, and FDI and output
growth are low. Kumar et al (2002) concentrate on forecasting crises and use logit model
to study currency crises in 32 developing countries during the years from 1985 to 1999.
They evaluate forecasts on an out-of-sample basis, estimating the model for one part of the
sample, and then forecasting crashes in the remaining sample period. Their model has
relatively good forecasting power.
Nevertheless, the literature remains nearly devoid of studies that apply commonly
used indicators simultaneously, so it is hard to say whether the appropriate indictors have
actually been identified.
6 The exception appears to be Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002).
They consider 27 commonly used indicators, but report only the six variables that were
found significant.
Banking sector indicators, notably, are rarely applied in the crisis literature. Moreover,
the empirical literature on banking crises is almost entirely limited to the studies of
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 1999). These studies apply several variables and
study how a multivariate logit model explains banking sector fragility. Examining a panel
of 53 developed and developing countries over the period 1980–1995, they find that low
GDP growth, high real interest rates, a high M2 to reserves ratio and the deposit insurance
dummy are significant in explaining banking crises.
To improve the status of the current literature we study the causes of currency crises
by estimating a probit model with 23 of the most commonly used macroeconomic and
financial sector indicators. We also explore the underlying causes of banking crises.
3  Methodology and indicators
3.1 Methodology
We use a panel regression model to estimate the main reasons for financial crises in
emerging markets. Given our indicators, the model estimates the probability for crisis. The
estimated model takes the form
(1) . ), , ( ) , 1 ( W W W W LW     β β = =
where W corresponds to our set of indicators and β W is a vector of unknown parameters.
7
The observed variable LW	receives a value of 0 or 1 depending on whether a crisis has
occurred or not. With a probit or logit model, the right-hand side of the model is
constrained between 0 and 1, and is compared to the observed value LW. The probit model
                                                
6 For further probit models see e.g. Berg - Pattillo (1998), Brüggemann – Linne (2002) and Milesi-Ferretti –
Razin (1998).
7 The set-up of our estimated model somewhat resembles Brüggemann and Linne (2002).Tuomas Komulainen and Johanna Lukkarila What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
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assumes that the probability distribution function (LW￿ conditional on LW) corresponds to
normal distribution.
8
Since in currency crisis situation a successful attack leads to sharp currency
depreciation and substantial reserve losses, both the signal approach and limited-dependent
models traditionally define a currency crisis as a discrete event. One common technique is
to construct an index of exchange market pressure as a weighted average of exchange rate
changes and reserves changes (as well as interest rates in some cases). The crisis is said to
occur when the index exceeds a country-specific threshold level.
9
We calculate an exchange market pressure index (EMP) for each country. The index
includes exchange rate depreciation and loss of reserves, which are weighted to influence
equally. The exchange market pressure index takes the form
(2)
where ∆ 
 denotes the change in exchange rate and ∆  in international reserves,  H σ  and  U σ
denote the standard deviation of exchange rate alteration and reserves respectively. We
determine the values of the EMP index more than two standard deviations above the mean
as a crisis.
10
Since macroeconomic variables often worsen prior to the actual crisis, we define crisis
not only by the crisis month but also the eleven months before the crisis. In other words,
we use a one-year window for our variables.
11
3.2 Indicators
The tested indicators are selected on the basis of currency crisis theories and previous
empirical literature. Banking sector problems, for example, have been blamed for the
recent financial crises in Asia, so, in addition to the traditional macroeconomic variables,
we include several indicators describing the vulnerability of domestic banks.
12 These
indicators include the growth of bank deposits, the ratio of the lending rate to the deposit
rate, the ratio of bank reserves to assets, and the ratio of bank foreign liabilities to GDP. To
                                                
8 We also applied a logit model and the results are similar to those of the probit model. The results are
available upon request. Previous studies mainly use probit models. Since in probit model the conditional
probability approaches one or zero with higher rate, it might yield better estimation results than the logit
model when studying financial crises.
9 One problem is that this definition disregards the depth of the crisis.
10 We also experimented with multiplying the standard deviation by one-half and three, but the coefficient
two seems to best capture actual crises. See Table A3 in the appendix for results, as well as Wyplosz (1998)
for examples and discussion. We identified 139 currency crises and 78 separate crisis periods in our sample.
Since the EMP index often exceeds the threshold level several times after another, there are fewer 12-month
long crisis periods. With the coefficient one-half, we felt that we detected too many crises (263), and with the
coefficient three, some major crises were missed, e.g. Russia in 1994-1995, the Czech Republic in 1997 and
Mexico in 1985.
11 We tested our model with a one-month crisis period. Since one month is a short period, such results are
unlikely to expose variables causing the crisis. Thus, we chose twelve months as our crisis period. Earlier
literature uses either one- or two-year periods to define a crisis window. See e.g. Goldstein et al. (2000).
12 Table A1 in the appendix gives a list and explanations of our indicators.
, * ) / (  
  U H ∆ − ∆ = σ σBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2003
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study the twin-crisis hypothesis, i.e. whether banking and currency crises are related, we
include a banking crisis dummy. The timing of banking crises is based on previous
studies.
13 We also employ variables that indicate vulnerability to a sudden stop of capital
inflows. These variables are short-term capital inflows, public debt, broad money to
reserves, and private sector liabilities.
14
To study foreign influences on crises, we include the US interest rate and the Standard
& Poors / IFC equity market index for emerging markets.
15 As a public debate over the
wisdom of the chosen exchange rate regime often ensues after a crisis, we divided the
exchange rate regimes into fixed, intermediate or floating, and included dummy variables
for fixed and intermediate regimes.
16   
Some scholars single out financial liberalisation as a possible cause for crises, noting
most emerging markets liberalised their financial sectors and capital flows during the
1980s and early 1990s. That deregulation was followed by a period of capital inflows that
reversed at the threat of an impending crisis. Thus, we include dummies to measure the
internal and external liberalisation. External liberalisation is measured by liberalisation of
capital account and internal by deregulation of domestic interest rates.
17
Our study thus incorporates a total of 23 macroeconomic and financial variables,
including dummy variables for exchange rate regime, banking crises, and liberalisation.
Since we study all these variables simultaneously, we hope to distinguish those indicators
that reflect actual causes of the recent crises in emerging markets. We further attempt to
verify the correctness of findings of earlier studies.
3.3 Sample  and  data
The model is estimated for a panel of monthly observations for 31 emerging or developing
countries and covers the period 1980:1 – 2001:12. Our sample includes those Latin
American, Asian, African and European countries defined as middle-income countries
under the World Bank’s classification system. The data for transition countries naturally
does not start before 1991.
18 While annual data gives access to a larger set of indicators
and countries, monthly data better captures the sudden nature of crises and variance of
indicators.
19
                                                
13 The timing for banking crises we have taken from studies by Kaminsky et al (2000), Lindgren et al (1996)
and Mahar - Williamson (1998).
14 We use banks’ claims on the private sector to measure the liabilities or the indebtedness of the private
sector. We divide the figure further by GDP.
15 The index measures contagion indirectly, i.e. the index decreases when major crises take place in emerging
markets. Unfortunately, the index starts from 1984:12, so we calculated the index from the individual
markets backward to 1980:1.
16 The distribution of exchange rate regimes is taken from Reinhart −  Rogoff (2002) and from IMF country
reports.
17 The timing of liberalization is taken from Mahar −  Williamson (1998), EBRD transition reports and
Kaminsky et al (2000).
18 See Table A1 in the appendix for a complete list of countries. Due to data problems, only Morocco and
South Africa are included from Africa. The data for Poland and Hungary start from 1991; for other transition
countries, they begin from 1993.
19 Where monthly data was unavailable, the monthly series were generated by linear interpolation from
quarterly or annual data. In some cases, the data have been garnered from IMF country reports. For someTuomas Komulainen and Johanna Lukkarila What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
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Most data are gathered from International Financial Statistics. The data for unemployment
rate are taken from ILO databases, while government debt figures come from several
sources, including IFS, the World Bank’s WDI and IMF country reports. The detailed
description of the data is provided in Table 1 in the appendix.
First, we examine the causes of currency and banking crises occurring throughout the
sample period, i.e. 1980:1 – 2001:12. Next, we divide the sample into pre- and post-
liberalisation periods. Since financial liberalisation can cause problems for the countries
after the initial capital inflow period, we also study liberalisation with various lags.
4 Results
This section presents the reasons for currency and banking crises received with the used
method, and the following section discusses the role of liberalisation more profoundly. The
main results for the entire sample 1980:1–2001:12 are summarised in Table 1.
20 The signs
of our indicators are mostly as expected. Regarding the individual indicators, we find that
the probability of currency crises increases along with public debt, private sector liabilities,
current account deficits, the ratio of M2 to reserves, foreign liabilities of banks, inflation,
unemployment, and overvaluation of the real exchange rate.
21 In addition, currency crises
seem to be highly related to banking crises, which supports the twin-crisis argument
proposed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). Higher US interest rates and a decreasing EM
market index also seem to foreshadow currency crises. The exact results are reported in
Table A4 in the appendix.
Table A4 also reports the marginal effects of individual variables (column (dy/dx)X )
at the point where the fundamentals are weak.
22 The results indicate that private sector
liabilities, US interest rates, unemployment, foreign liabilities of banks, and inflation have
the highest effect on crisis probability. The high significance of private sector indebtedness
and foreign liabilities of banks is particularly interesting and supports the arguments that
extensive borrowing by domestic banks or private enterprises, i.e. large financial markets,
render emerging economies susceptible to crises.
The results also indicate that external liberalisation reduces the probability of currency
crisis −  at least, for the next twelve months. This might be expected, since a capital inflow
period usually follows liberalisation of the capital account.
23 Moreover, a high interest rate
                                                                                                                                                   
countries, unemployment figures, interest rates or government debt was unavailable for some periods. In
those cases, the missing data were generated with the impute command of Stata software. Unemployment
and public debt were limited to positive values. As stated above, we chose to use monthly data, because it
better captures the sudden nature of crises. Also earlier studies have received better results with monthly data.
See Goldstein et al (2000) for discussion.
20 Obviously, the data for transition countries does not start until 1991. We also estimated our model without
transition countries, when the sample is more balanced. The results are generally similar and available upon
request.
21 These include only those indicators where the sign is as expected and the influence is significant at the 1%
level. The real exchange rate is calculated vis-à-vis the US dollar. Overvaluation is determined as the
negative difference from a trend during 1980:1-2001:12.
22 The marginal effects are calculated at a point where the fundamentals are weak, i.e. the indicators are
calculated at the weakest quintile (the exact values are reported in Table 4 in column X).
23 When interpreting the results for liberalisation of capital account, note that we simultaneously control the
influence of short-term capital inflows, foreign liabilities of banks and the interest rate differential.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2003
13
differential seems to reduce the probability of crises, indicating that higher domestic
interest rates attract capital inflows and help avoid crises. Surprisingly, growth of exports
seems to increase the probability of crisis. For the entire sample, an intermediate exchange
rate regime reduces the probability of crisis.
Table 1.  Probit model, 1980:1 – 2001:12, currency crises
 	  	! "	! #!
$% Budget balance / GDP - -
Public debt / GDP + +* * *
M2 / Reserves ++ * * *
&	 Industrial production - -
' Inflation + +* * *
Unemployment rate + + ***
Domestic credit growth + + **
Exports - + **
Current account / GDP - - ***
Real exchange rate - - ***
"	 Banks deposits - -
Claims on private s. / GDP + + ***
Bank foreign liabilities / GDP + + ***
Lending rate / deposit rate -
+
-* *
Banks reserves / assets - +
Banking crisis dummy + + ***
( 	 FDI / GDP - -* * *
Short-term capital inflows/ GDP -
+
-*
Interest rate differential -
+
-* *
"! US interest rate + + ***
EM index - - **
)! Fixed exchange rate -
Intermediate regime - ***






One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table A4 reports also the goodness-of-fit of our model. Given the cut-off probability of
50%, the model correctly calls 32% of the crises and 98% of the tranquil periods. When the
cut-off probability is lowered to 25%, the model correctly indicates 56% of the crises and
92% of the tranquil periods. These results are slightly better than those surveyed by Berg
and Patillo (1999).
Comparing our results to earlier studies of Frankel and Rose (1996), Berg and Pattillo
(1999), and the survey by Kaminsky et al. (2000), we notice they are largely similar to
these earlier studies. The macroeconomic indicators found significant in both earlier
studies and this study are overvaluation of the real exchange rate, the M2 to reserves ratio,
inflation, and the current account deficit. To a lesser extent, we note low FDI and high
public debt also signal impending crises. Moreover, we find significant certain financialTuomas Komulainen and Johanna Lukkarila What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
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sector variables that were not generally included in earlier studies.
24 Our finding of strong
importance of private sector liabilities, foreign liabilities of banks, and unemployment,
differs from earlier studies.
Indicators deemed significant in earlier studies but not in ours are industrial
production and domestic credit growth. Growth of exports had a different sign. These
indicators may drop out in our study due to the fact we study many indicators
simultaneously. Another plausible explanation for this difference is that we are using only
emerging market countries, and the causes of crises may be different from those in
developed countries.
Next we examine the reasons for banking crises, and study whether the explanatory
variables are similar to currency crises. To do this, we estimate the probit model for
banking crises occurring within the entire sample period 1980-2001 (Table A5). As
expected, most of our banking sector indicators explain banking crises quite well.
25 The
effect of low lending to deposit rate and high private sector liabilities to banking sector
problems is particularly strong. Apparently, high private sector liabilities increase the
probability of banking and currency crises with large magnitude. Also some
macroeconomic variables and the dummy for currency crises increase the probability of
banking crises.
26 The large importance of public debt and low importance of industrial
production differ from earlier studies and suggest interesting areas for further investigation.
5  Liberalisation and the course of a typical crisis
To study whether the liberalisation of capital flows has changed the reasons for crises, we
divide our sample into two sub-samples, whereby the data for each country is divided into
pre- and post-liberalisation of capital flows. In most of the countries, the deregulation of
capital flows took place in the late 1980s or early 1990s. By 1998, all countries in our
sample had liberalised their capital accounts. The results are reported in Tables A6 and
A7.
27 Prior to liberalisation, unemployment, current account deficits, US interest rates, and
the foreign liabilities of banks have the highest effect on the probability of a currency
crisis. After liberalisation, high indebtedness of the private sector, high US interest rates,
high public debt, and high foreign liabilities of banks significantly increase the probability
of a currency crisis. In both samples, a banking crisis substantially increases the likelihood
                                                
24 High foreign liabilities of banks, a low lending to deposit ratio and banking crisis dummy seem to increase
the probability of currency crises.
25 The probability of banking crises increases when deposits, lending rate to deposit rate and banks’ reserves
to assets are decreasing, and claims on private sector are high. The sign of foreign liabilities of banks is
surprisingly negative. Fluctuations in the exchange rate may play a role here.
26 Macroeconomic variables that significantly increase the probability of banking crises are high public debt,
high M2 to reserves and low FDI.
27 The prior-liberalisation sample includes 42 crisis periods and the post-liberalisation sample 36 crisis
periods (Table A3). We also estimated our model for the sub-samples 1980:1-1990:12 and 1991:1–2001:12.
The results are available upon request. The results are mostly similar to the division according to
liberalisation dates.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2003
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of a currency crisis. The effects of a current account deficit, inflation, and FDI are much
lower after the liberalisation of capital flows than before.
The largest difference between the periods, however, is seen in private sector
liabilities. Before liberalisation, private sector liabilities decrease the probability of a crisis,
but after liberalisation higher private sector indebtedness increases with large magnitude
the probability of a crisis. One reason for this difference is the significantly higher level of
indebtedness after liberalisation. Between periods, the median of private sector liabilities
increased from 16% to 29% of GDP (appendix Figure A1).
28
Another notable difference between these periods concerns the role of exchange rate
regime. In the overall sample, as well as in the pre-liberalisation period, an intermediate
exchange rate regime decreases the currency crisis probability. After liberalisation, an
intermediate regime significantly increases the probability of a crisis. This result supports
the “two corners” hypothesis, i.e. the corner regimes (a hard fix and a floating exchange
rate) are safer than intermediate regimes (e.g. a crawling peg or band).
We also examine how the overall crisis probability changed with the liberalisation of
capital flows. First, for both samples we use the median level of fundamentals prevailing
before liberalisation. In other words, ceteris paribus, how does the liberalisation of capital
flows change the probability of crisis? With the median level of fundamentals the crisis
probability turns out to be much lower in the post-liberalisation period than prior to
liberalisation (1.4% and 20.9%, respectively). When we used the weak levels of
fundamentals, the crisis probabilities are almost similar pre- and post-liberalisation (37%
and 33%).
29 These results suggest that liberalisation of capital flows in itself did not cause
the recent crises in emerging markets, but the actual cause of the crises probably were the
deteriorated fundamentals.
To examine the role of liberalisation in depth, we lag the liberalisation variables (both
internal and external). The most interesting results are obtained when we use a two-year
lag for internal liberalisation and a four-and-a-half-year lag for external liberalisation, and
examine our model for the complete sample 1980-2001 (Table A8). The results indicate
that liberalisation of interest rates and capital flows decreases crisis vulnerability for a year,
but crises follow approximately two years after internal liberalisation and four-and-a-half
years after liberalisation of capital flows.
30 The positive effect of capital account
liberalisation on crisis probability is significant and relatively large.
Our results might best be summarised with a description of a typical emerging market
crisis. In this example, the capital account is liberalised approximately four to five years
before the actual currency crisis strikes. Deregulation allows foreign portfolio investments
into the country and a large increase in private and public sector indebtedness. Under these
circumstances an intermediate exchange regime becomes fragile for crises. Approximately
two years before the crisis, the domestic financial sector is also liberalised. In the final
months leading up to the crisis, the level of indebtedness (private and public sector
liabilities, and the foreign liabilities of banks) rise to a point where investors start to doubt
                                                
28 Similarly foreign liabilities of banks and public sector indebtedness have increased after the liberalisation
of capital flows (See Figure A1).
29 These crisis probabilities (37% and 33%) are calculated with the weakest quintile values of the indicators
(the exact values and results are reported in Table 6 and 7).
30 The result for internal liberalisation is quite similar to Wyplosz (2002) and Kaufmann −  Mehrez (2000).
Our results indicate the positive effect of capital account liberalization on currency crises begins after four
years and vanishes after five-and-a-half years. The exact timing of crises after liberalisation is obviously hard
to estimate.Tuomas Komulainen and Johanna Lukkarila What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
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the sustainability of the system. Consequently, a sudden capital outflow from these debt
instruments may follow. Simultaneously – and partly as a result of the currency
depreciation – the banking crisis becomes visible. The final push precipitating the crisis
might be high interest rates in the US or a knock-on effect from a crisis elsewhere in
emerging markets.
6  Conclusions
The study examined the reasons for financial crises in 31 emerging market countries
during 1980:1–2001:12. It estimated a probit model using 23 macroeconomic and financial
sector indicators, including dummy variables for banking crises, exchange rate regime, and
liberalisation. We found that the probability of currency crisis increases along with
increases in private sector liabilities, public debt, foreign liabilities of banks,
unemployment, and inflation. Moreover, currency and banking crises are highly linked,
and US interest rates influence the occurrence of currency crises in emerging markets.
Whereas problems in the banking sector are well reflected in high private sector liabilities,
high public indebtedness and a low lending to deposit rate.
When we divided our sample to prior- and post-liberalisation periods, it turned out
that the indicators of indebtedness are more important for crisis probability after
liberalisation, whereas the significance of real variables diminish. Intermediate exchange
rate regimes appear vulnerable to currency crises after liberalisation of the capital account.
Moreover, we found that currency crises follow approximately two years after the
liberalisation of domestic financial sectors and four-and-a-half years after the liberalisation
of capital flows. Our results, however, do not support the argument that the deregulation of
capital flows in itself was the cause of recent crises in emerging markets.
Clearly, private sector liabilities, foreign borrowing of banks, and public indebtedness,
had a profound influence on the occurrence of financial crises in emerging markets.
Indeed, crisis vulnerability arises after authorities or domestic agents have issued large
amounts of financial liabilities in forms that permit a sudden capital outflow. This pattern
of increasing indebtedness was seen in emerging market countries after the liberalisation of
capital flows and domestic financial sectors.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2003
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Appendix
Table A1  Countries


	   
Argentina India Bulgaria Morocco











%		*$+: IFS line 78bgd divided by IFS line 99b.
"!%		*$+: IFS line 78bed divided by IFS line 99b.
(*$+: IFS line 78ald divided by IFS line 99b.
$) 	: IFS line 70d.
$) 		: IFS line 24 plus line 25.
&! 	: IFS line 60p divided by IFS line 60l.
,-*	%	: IFS line 34 plus 35 converted to dollars (using IFS line ae) divided
by IFS line 1L.d.
+	!): IFS line 32.
		%	*			: IFS line 20 divided by the sum of lines 21 and 22a-22g.
	!	*$+: IFS line 26c.
(	 %	*$+: IFS line 32d divided by IFS line 99b.
	 )!: IFS line 66. If unavailable, then line 66aa.
.(/: IFS line 64.
0 t: IFS line 67r.
!*$+: IFS line 80 divide by line 99b.
*$+: IFS line 88z divided by line 99b.
	: IFS line 60b for the country minus line 60b for USA
0#	: IFS line 60b for USA.
%%)!: IFS line ae deflated by consumer prices. Deviations from the
trend were computed by HP filter.
!		: Timing for banking crises determined by previous studies.
	
 Timing for internal and external liberalisation determined by Mahar− Williamson
(1998), EBRD’s transition reports and Kaminsky et al (2000).
,: Standard & Poors / IFC Emerging market indexTuomas Komulainen and Johanna Lukkarila What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
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)!!	: We follow the classification by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), but divide
the regimes into three categories (fixed, intermediate and floating); currency board, peg and
horizontal band narrower or equal to 2% were classified as fixed regimes; crawling pegs and bands
narrower or equal to 5% were classified as intermediate regimes; managed and freely floating were
classified as floating regimes. If Reinhart and Rogoff use a freely falling regime (e.g. inflation over
40%), we follow the classification system of IMF country reports.
Table A2   The indicators
	  	!  
$% Budget balance / GDP - Insolvency expectations /credit creation
" Debt / GDP + Insolvency expectations / sudden stop
M2 / Reserves + High ratio creates vulnerability
&	 Industrial Production - Recessions often accompany crisis
' Unemployment + Creates incentives to devalue
Inflation + Lowers demand for pesos
Domestic credit growth + Credit expansion lowers d. for pesos
Exports - Exports create demand for pesos
Current Account / GDP - Surplus creates demand for pesos
Overvaluation of RER - Harms competitiveness
"	 Bank Deposits - A bank run induces capital outflows
Claims on Private Sector/ GDP + Measures lending boom / sudden stop
Banks Foreign Liabilities/ GDP + Vulnerable to sudden stops
Lending rate / Deposit rate -
+
Low ratio signals unprofitable banks
Banks increase lending rates in crisis
Banks Reserves / Assets - High ratio indicates bank soundness
Banking Crisis Dummy + BC induces capital outflows
( 	 Short-term capital inflows / GDP +
-
Induce vulnerability
Capital inflows are beneficial
FDI / GDP - FDI more stable /increase productivity




 US interest rate + High US rates induce capital outflows
EM index - Measures contagion
)	 Fixed exchange rate regime
Intermediate exchange rate




Capital inflows can help avoid crisis
Table A3   Number of crises
Number of crises
Currency crises, 1980-2001
 - 1,5 * st.dev. 263
 - 2 * st.dev. 139
 - 3 * st.dev. 72
Currency crisis periods
 - entire sample, 1980-2001 78
 - before liberalization  42
 - after liberalization 36
Banking crises periods
 - entire sample, 1980-2001 40Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2003
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Table A4   Probit model 1980:1 – 2001:12, currency crises
One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For dummy variables (dy/dx)X is the
discrete change from 0 to 1. The values in column X are the weakest quintiles of the variables.
Note: A pre-crisis period is correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is above the cut-off during the 12 months window and
currency crisis occurs.
Random-effects probit Number of obs = 6828
Group variable (i) : i Number of groups = 31 Y = Pr (X=median)
0.039
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Pseudo R2 = 0.164
Y = Pr (X=weak)
Wald chi2(25) =  754.41 0.238
Log likelihood  = -2496.8887 Prob > chi2 = 0.000
bop Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] dy/dx X X (weak)
budgetbal -.0031717 .0033316 -0.95 0.341 -.0097014 0.0033581 0.0058 -5.9
publicdebt .0022502 .0006724 3.35 0.001 .0009323 .0035681 0.0449 64.5 ***
M2toR .0099695 .0013993 7.12 0.000 .0072269 .0127121 0.0256 8.3 ***
industprod -.0010737 .0025993 -0.41 0.680 -.0061682 .0040207 0.0005 -1.6
inflation .0592954 .005083 11.67 0.000 .0493328 .069258 0.0550 3 ***
unempl .0318399 .0082605 3.85 0.000 .0156496 .0480302 0.0985 10 ***
domcred .0028668 .0013055 2.2 0.028 .000308 .0054257 0.0039 4.4 **
exports .002004 .0009134 2.19 0.028 .0002137 .0037943 -0.0053 -8.6 **
currentacc -.0221354 .0045858 -4.83 0.000 -.0311235 -.0131473 0.0377 -5.5 ***
RER -.0272922 .0018561 -14.70 0.000 -.0309301 -.0236544 0.0388 -4.6 ***
bankdepo -.002963 .0031795 -0.93 0.351 -.0091946 .0032687 -0.0002 0.2
claimspriv .0081795 .001375 5.95 0.000 .0054845 .0108745 0.1298 51.3 ***
banksforliab .0163276 .0021469 7.61 0.000 .0121197 .0205356 0.0566 11.2 ***
lenddeporate -.080989 .0405752 -2.00 0.046 -.160515 -.0014631 -0.0301 1.2 **
brestoasset .3005097 .2179622 1.38 0.168 -.1266885 .7277078 0.0037 0.04
bc .8415151 .0600343 14.02 0.000 .72385 .9591801 0.3132 ***
stcinflow -.0126551 .0065 -1.95 0.052 -.025395 .0000847 0.0012 -0.3 *
FDI -.042059 .01132 -3.72 0.000 -.0642458 -.0198723 -0.0026 0.2 ***
ratediff -1.53e-07 7.43e-08 -2.06 0.039 -2.99e-07 -7.58e-09 0.0000 0.7 **
usrate .0380136 .007109 5.35 0.000 .0240802 .0519469 0.1053 8.95 ***
EMindex -.0074362 .0033403 -2.23 0.026 -.013983 -.0008894 0.0087 -3.8 **
fixedexr -.0748642 .0669238 -1.12 0.263 -.2060324 .0563041 -0.0225
intermexr -.296749 .0533191 -5.57 0.000 -.4012525 -.1922456 -0.1007 ***
libinternal -.1306011 .1107051 -1.18 0.238 -.3475791 .0863768 -0.0385
libexternal -.4124916 .1393167 -2.96 0.003 -.6855473 -.139436 -0.1077 ***
_cons -2.284031 .1599066 -14.28 0.000 -2.597442 -1.97062
/lnsig2u -1.50285 .1291191 -1.7559 1.249781
sigma_u .4716939 .0304524 .4156302 .53532
rho .1820009 .0192228 .1473022 .222738
Likelihood ratio test of rho = 0: chibar2(01) = 274.24 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000
Goodness-of-fit, cut-off prob. 50%
tranquil crisis
predicts tranquil 97.98 67.95
predicts crisis  2.02 32.05
Goodness-of-fit, cut-off prob. 25%
tranquil crisis
predicts tranquil 91.56 43.59
predicts crisis  8.44 56.41Tuomas Komulainen and Johanna Lukkarila What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
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Table A5   Probit model 1980:1 – 2001:12, banking crises
 One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For dummy variables (dy/dx)X is the discrete change
from 0 to 1. The values in column X are the weakest quintiles of the variables.
Random-effects probit Number of obs = 6828
Group variable (i) : i Number of groups = 31 Y = Pr (X=median)
0.0796
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Pseudo R2 = 0.137
Y = Pr (X=weak)
Wald chi2(25) =  538.27 0.203
Log likelihood  = -1763.5199 Prob > chi2 = 0.000
bc Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] dy/dx X X (weak)
budgetbal 0.007724 0.004169 1.85 0.064 -0.000448 0.015895 -0.0129 -5.9 *
publicdebt 0.014633 0.000977 14.98 0.000 0.012718 0.016548 0.2663 64.5 ***
M2toR 0.016116 0.001979 8.14 0.000 0.012237 0.019995 0.0377 8.3 ***
industprod -0.005670 0.002628 -2.16 0.031 -0.010820 -0.000520 0.0026 -1.6 **
inflation -0.013586 0.005693 -2.39 0.017 -0.024744 -0.002427 -0.0115 3 **
unempl -0.013757 0.008952 -1.54 0.124 -0.031302 0.003789 -0.0388 10
domcred -0.001661 0.000439 -3.78 0.000 -0.002521 -0.000800 -0.0021 4.4 ***
exports 0.000493 0.001144 0.43 0.666 -0.001748 0.002735 -0.0012 -8.6
currentacc 0.023817 0.005709 4.17 0.000 0.012628 0.035006 -0.0370 -5.5 ***
RER 0.011992 0.001962 6.11 0.000 0.008147 0.015838 -0.0156 -4.6 ***
bankdepo -0.020820 0.004554 -4.57 0.000 -0.029745 -0.011896 -0.0012 0.2 ***
claimspriv 0.009847 0.001592 6.19 0.000 0.006726 0.012967 0.1425 51.3 ***
banksforliab -0.021233 0.003126 -6.79 0.000 -0.027360 -0.015106 -0.0671 11.2 ***
lenddeporate -0.468875 0.052998 -8.85 0.000 -0.572750 -0.365000 -0.1587 1.2 ***
brestoasset -0.825377 0.242834 -3.4 0.001 -1.301323 -0.349432 -0.0093 0.04 ***
bop 0.868008 0.060531 14.34 0.000 0.749369 0.986647 0.3116 ***
stcinflow -0.004567 0.008220 -0.56 0.578 -0.020677 0.011543 0.0004 -0.3
FDI -0.045597 0.013947 -3.27 0.001 -0.072933 -0.018260 -0.0026 0.2 ***
ratediff 0.000002 0.000001 2.36 0.018 0.000000 0.000003 0.0000 0.7 **
usrate -0.003836 0.008983 -0.43 0.669 -0.021442 0.013770 -0.0097 8.95
EMindex -0.001288 0.003997 -0.32 0.747 -0.009121 0.006546 0.0014 -3.8
fixedexr -0.068328 0.069316 -0.99 0.324 -0.204185 0.067530 -0.0187
intermexr 0.214466 0.060923 3.52 0.000 0.095059 0.333874 0.0550 ***
libinternal -0.557856 0.155991 -3.58 0.000 -0.863592 -0.252120 -0.1204 ***
libexternal -0.253828 0.128048 -1.98 0.047 -0.504798 -0.002859 -0.0639 **
_cons -1.342176 0.160723 -8.35 0.000 -1.657187 -1.027164
/lnsig2u -0.4010946 0.1066715 -0.6101669 -0.1920223
sigma_u 0.8182828 0.0436437 0.7370619 0.9084539
rho 0.4010494 0.0256234 0.3520211 0.4521414
Likelihood ratio test of rho = 0: chibar2(01) =504.53 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2003
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Table A6  Probit model, periods before the liberalisations, currency crises
 One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For dummy variables (dy/dx)X is the
discrete change from 0 to 1. The values in column X are the weakest quintiles of the variables.
Random-effects probit                            Number of obs = 2671
Group variable (i) : i                           Number of groups = 24 Y = Pr (X=median)
0.2086
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Pseudo R2 = 0.1831
Y = Pr (X=weak)
Wald chi2(25) =  411.32 0.37
Log likelihood  = -1116.5438  Prob > chi2 = 0.000
bop Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] dy/dx X X (weak)
budgetbal 0.01275 0.00513 2.49 0.013 0.002698 0.022798 -0.0284 -5.9 **
publicdebt 0.00129 0.00131 0.98 0.326 -0.001278 0.003848 0.0313 64.5
M2toR 0.00886 0.00170 5.22 0.000 0.005533 0.012179 0.0278 8.3 ***
industprod 0.00703 0.00695 1.01 0.312 -0.006591 0.020646 -0.0042 -1.6
inflation 0.05763 0.00696 8.28 0.000 0.043997 0.071271 0.0653 3 ***
unempl 0.13222 0.01897 6.97 0.000 0.095051 0.169392 0.4993 10 ***
domcred 0.00388 0.00255 1.52 0.128 -0.001120 0.008880 0.0064 4.4
exports 0.00074 0.00184 0.4 0.686 -0.002858 0.004346 -0.0024 -8.6
currentacc -0.08133 0.00980 -8.3 0.000 -0.100532 -0.062130 0.1689 -5.5 ***
RER -0.02632 0.00250 -10.53 0.000 -0.031222 -0.021426 0.0457 -4.6 ***
bankdepo -0.00015 0.00402 -0.04 0.970 -0.008023 0.007724 0.0000 0.2
claimspriv -0.02098 0.00437 -4.81 0.000 -0.029531 -0.012420 -0.4064 51.3 ***
banksforliab 0.02344 0.00989 2.37 0.018 0.004050 0.042833 0.0991 11.2 **
lenddeporate -0.00366 0.08656 -0.04 0.966 -0.173315 0.165995 -0.0017 1.2
brestoasset -0.66103 0.29398 -2.25 0.025 -1.237221 -0.084848 -0.0100 0.04 **
bc 0.67350 0.09925 6.79 0.000 0.478971 0.868036 0.2637 ***
stcinflow 0.07734 0.02629 2.94 0.003 0.025821 0.128861 -0.0088 -0.3 ***
FDI -0.18978 0.03604 -5.27 0.000 -0.260423 -0.119130 -0.0143 0.2 ***
ratediff -1.54E-07 7.44E-08 -2.07 0.038 -3.00E-07 -8.21E-09 0.0000 0.7 **
usrate 0.03202 0.01105 2.9 0.004 0.010370 0.053672 0.1082 8.95
EMindex -0.00168 0.00547 -0.31 0.759 -0.012395 0.009034 0.0024 -3.8
fixedexr 0.13171 0.10528 1.25 0.211 -0.074637 0.338050 0.0507
intermexr -0.46744 0.09098 -5.14 0.000 -0.645765 -0.289115 -0.1580 ***
_cons -1.88376 0.28386 -6.64 0.000 -2.440117 -1.327393
/lnsig2u -0.6772258 0.1559094 -0.9828026 -0.371649
sigma_u 0.7127583 0.0555629 0.6117685 0.8304193
rho 0.3368808 0.0348289 0.2723361 0.4081426
Likelihood ratio test of rho = 0: chibar2(01) = 168.60  Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000Tuomas Komulainen and Johanna Lukkarila What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
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Table A7   Probit model, periods after liberalisations, currency crises
 One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For dummy variables (dy/dx)X is the
discrete change from 0 to 1. The values in column X are the weakest quintiles of the variables.
Random-effects probit                            Number of obs =4157 Y = Pr (X=median)
Group variable (i) : i                           Number of groups = 31 0.0088
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Pseudo R2 = 0.201 Y = Pr (X=weak)
0.3334
Wald chi2(25) =  484.00
Log likelihood  = -1126.0823  Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Y = Pr (X=medianB)
0.0137
bop Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] dy/dx X X (weak)
budgetbal -0.007037 0.005008 -1.41 0.160 -0.0168534 0.002779 0.0151 -5.9
publicdebt 0.005671 0.001487 3.81 0.000 0.0027557 0.0085859 0.1330 64.5 ***
M2toR 0.032898 0.005794 5.68 0.000 0.0215425 0.0442544 0.0993 8.3 ***
industprod 0.007339 0.003040 2.41 0.016 0.0013799 0.0132979 -0.0043 -1.6 **
inflation 0.058770 0.011376 5.17 0.000 0.0364737 0.0810654 0.0641 3 ***
unempl 0.033431 0.012250 2.73 0.006 0.009421 0.0574403 0.1216 10 ***
domcred 0.003059 0.001658 1.84 0.065 -0.0001909 0.0063094 0.0049 4.4 *
exports 0.002188 0.001120 1.95 0.051 -0.00000792 0.004384 -0.0068 -8.6 *
currentacc -0.000627 0.005921 -0.11 0.916 -0.0122311 0.0109773 0.0013 -5.5
RER -0.030433 0.003105 -9.8 0.000 -0.0365191 -0.0243478 0.0509 -4.6 ***
bankdepo 0.001642 0.008571 0.19 0.848 -0.0151578 0.0184411 0.0001 0.2
claimspriv 0.032345 0.002387 13.55 0.000 0.0276667 0.0370225 0.6022 51.3 ***
banksforliab 0.021282 0.002305 9.23 0.000 0.0167639 0.0257998 0.0867 11.2 ***
lenddeporate -0.032354 0.047982 -0.67 0.500 -0.1263964 0.0616891 -0.0141 1.2
brestoasset 2.486667 0.528445 4.71 0.000 1.450934 3.522399 0.0362 0.04 ***
bc 0.867673 0.088097 9.85 0.000 0.6950052 1.04034 0.3356 ***
stcinflow -0.018400 0.007122 -2.58 0.010 -0.0323587 -0.0044404 0.0002 -0.3 **
FDI -0.020130 0.012746 -1.58 0.114 -0.0451117 0.0048526 -0.0015 0.2
ratediff -0.000015 0.000014 -1.08 0.280 -0.0000434 0.0000126 0.0000 0.7
usrate 0.131947 0.015109 8.73 0.000 0.1023333 0.1615597 0.4294 8.95 ***
EMindex -0.011663 0.004809 -2.43 0.015 -0.0210887 -0.0022377 0.0161 -3.8 **
fixedexr -0.443972 0.117946 -3.76 0.000 -0.6751419 -0.2128014 -0.1425 ***
intermexr 0.219100 0.079271 2.76 0.006 0.0637314 0.3744676 0.0754 ***
_cons -5.144122 0.303335 -16.96 0.000 -5.738648 -4.549596
/lnsig2u -0.0024231 0.138254 -0.2733959 0.2685497
sigma_u 0.9987892 0.0690433 0.8722336 1.143707
rho 0.4993942 0.0345634 0.4320736 0.5667368
Likelihood ratio test of rho = 0: chibar2(01) =356.29 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2003
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Table A8   Probit model 1980:1 – 2001:12, currency crises, liberalisation lagged
 One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For dummy variables (dy/dx)X is the
discrete change from 0 to 1. The values in column X are the weakest quintiles of the variables.
The internal liberalisation is lagged by two years and the external liberalisation is lagged by four and half years.
Random-effects probit                            Number of obs = 6828
Group variable (i) : i                           Number of groups = 31 Y = Pr (X=median)
0.041
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Pseudo R2 = 0.1653
Y = Pr (X=weak)
Wald chi2(25) =  754.43 0.252
Log likelihood  = -2493.4654  Prob > chi2 = 0.000
bop Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] dy/dx X X (weak)
budgetbal -0.004011 0.003368 -1.19 0.234 -0.010612 0.002591 0.0076 -5.9
publicdebt 0.001469 0.000707 2.08 0.038 0.000084 0.002854 0.0303 64.5 **
M2toR 0.009087 0.001387 6.55 0.000 0.006368 0.011806 0.0241 8.3 ***
industprod -0.001298 0.002691 -0.48 0.630 -0.006571 0.003976 0.0007 -1.6
inflation 0.064154 0.005536 11.59 0.000 0.053304 0.075005 0.0615 3 ***
unempl 0.035777 0.008261 4.33 0.000 0.019586 0.051969 0.1143 10 ***
domcred 0.002842 0.001304 2.18 0.029 0.000286 0.005398 0.0040 4.4 **
exports 0.001869 0.000916 2.04 0.041 0.000074 0.003663 -0.0051 -8.6 **
currentacc -0.020248 0.004961 -4.08 0.000 -0.029971 -0.010525 0.0356 -5.5 ***
RER -0.027826 0.001916 -14.52 0.000 -0.031580 -0.024071 0.0409 -4.6 ***
bankdepo -0.001983 0.002973 -0.67 0.505 -0.007811 0.003845 -0.0001 0.2
claimspriv 0.007880 0.001639 4.81 0.000 0.004668 0.011091 0.1291 51.3 ***
banksforliab 0.016228 0.002081 7.8 0.000 0.012150 0.020306 0.0580 11.2 ***
lenddeporate -0.076783 0.040278 -1.91 0.057 -0.155727 0.002162 -0.0294 1.2 *
brestoasset 0.115676 0.226067 0.51 0.609 -0.327407 0.558759 0.0015 0.04
bc 0.862344 0.067064 12.86 0.000 0.730901 0.993787 0.3251 ***
stcinflow -0.013382 0.006401 -2.09 0.037 -0.025928 -0.000837 0.0013 -0.3 **
FDI -0.039854 0.011279 -3.53 0.000 -0.061961 -0.017748 -0.0025 0.2 ***
ratediff 0.000000 0.000000 -1.77 0.076 0.000000 0.000000 0.0000 0.7 *
usrate 0.044422 0.007154 6.21 0.000 0.030401 0.058442 0.1270 8.95 ***
EMindex -0.007416 0.003335 -2.22 0.026 -0.013953 -0.000880 0.0090 -3.8 **
fixedexr -0.111467 0.070114 -1.59 0.112 -0.248889 0.025954 -0.0342
intermexr -0.303795 0.054229 -5.6 0.000 -0.410083 -0.197508 -0.1058 ***
libinternal (+2yr.) 0.213167 0.098266 2.17 0.030 0.020570 0.405765 0.0726 **
libexternal (+4,5 yr.) 0.373103 0.099417 3.75 0.000 0.178248 0.567957 0.1320 ***
_cons -2.265001 0.152578 -14.84 0.000 -2.564049 -1.965954
/lnsig2u -1.677301 0.1703182 -2.011119 -1.343484
sigma_u 0.4322935 0.0368137 0.3658399 0.510818
rho 0.1574532 0.0225947 0.1180405 0.2069377
Likelihood ratio test of rho = 0: chibar2(01) = 283.00 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000Tuomas Komulainen and Johanna Lukkarila What drives financial crises in emerging markets?
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